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THE AGE OF DISCIPLINE: THE 
RELEVANCE OF AGE TO THE 
REASONABLENESS OF CORPORAL 
PUNISHMENT 
KRISTIN COLLINS COPE* 
“Corporal punishment is the use of physical force with the intention of 
causing a child to experience pain, but not injury, for the purpose of correction or 
control of the child’s behavior.”1 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
For several decades, the debate about “appropriate” punishment of children 
has raged on, and today two polarized camps still seem to dominate the 
discussion. On one side of the debate are those who believe that physical 
punishment should remain available as a disciplinary tool. On the other side are 
those who oppose its use altogether. This disagreement is playing out in the 
academic sphere, as well as in popular culture, and involves complex differences 
over the rights of parents and children, culture and religion, and the scientific 
case for and against corporal punishment based on the child’s responses and 
development. 
Lawmakers have also struggled with whether parents’ use of corporal 
punishment is dangerous, effective, or justified. One state even saw efforts to 
ban corporal punishment in the home altogether. In 2007, a Massachusetts state 
legislator introduced a bill to ban spanking in the home at the behest of a local 
nurse.2 The bill was easily defeated, but it evoked intense publicity at the 
possibility, nonetheless.3 
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 1. MURRAY A. STRAUS, BEATING THE DEVIL OUT OF THEM: CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN 
AMERICAN FAMILIES 4 (1994). 
 2. Should It Be Illegal for Parents to Spank Their Children? Massachusetts Could Become First 
State to Outlaw Corporal Punishment, ABCNEWS.COM (Nov. 28, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/ 
WN/story?id=3921895. 
 3. The bill was sent to die in committee. See H. 3922, 185th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2008), 
available at http://www.mass.gov/legis/185history/h03922.htm; Should It Be Illegal to Spank Your Child? 
Massachusetts Lawmakers Propose a Ban on Corporal Punishment, ABCNEWS.COM (Mar. 11, 2008), 
http://abcnews.go.com/video/playerIndex?id=3933700. 
COPE 10/12/2010 4:56:19 PM 
168 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 73:167 
Notwithstanding these debates and initiatives, all fifty states continue to 
allow parents to use corporal punishment as a disciplinary tool, limiting its use 
to what is “reasonable.”4 Conversely, all states describe unreasonable or 
excessive corporal punishment as child abuse,5 but their legislatures have 
hesitated to specify the acts and injuries that transgress the bounds of 
reasonableness. The effect of this more “open” standard and approach has been 
to leave to the courts and other relevant legal actors the difficult task of 
assessing what is “reasonable” in individual cases, to sort the acceptable from 
the prohibited. Faced with these objectives, courts have discussed various 
factors to consider in that assessment. Among the factors are the parent’s act, 
the amount of force used, the extent of injury caused, and the child’s behavior 
and mental condition. Increasingly, courts and legislatures have also begun to 
consider the child’s age in evaluating the reasonableness both of the parent’s 
disciplinary motive and of the nature and degree of the force used. In 
governments’ efforts to determine what is “reasonable” (and thus allowable) 
corporal punishment, the age of the child has become a focal point—a new and 
important factor in calling balls and strikes. 
Actors in all branches of government are beginning to take steps to make 
age matter in corporal-punishment law, but the methods for doing so are wide-
ranging. This paper first addresses the reasonableness standard and its 
relationship to the underlying purposes of corporal punishment generally. It 
then describes the various approaches to the consideration of age: some 
explicitly introduce age as a factor in assessing “reasonableness” in individual 
cases, while others use age benchmarks for prohibiting corporal punishment 
before or after certain ages. This paper then evaluates these varying approaches 
in the longstanding effort to give meaning to the term “reasonableness” in the 
context of corporal punishment. 
II 
THE REASONABLENESS STANDARD 
State legislatures historically have offered little guidance regarding what is 
reasonable corporal punishment. Originally, statutes defined acceptable 
corporal punishment through specifying what was not child abuse: forty-eight 
states and the District of Columbia took this approach.6 Today, most states still 
use “reasonableness” as the statutory standard for corporal punishment. Some 
 
 4. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-24 (2009); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-403 (2009); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 53a-18 (2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 750.136b (West 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-
05 (2009). 
 5. See Doriane L. Coleman, Kenneth A. Dodge & Sarah K. Campbell, Where and How to Draw 
the Line Between Reasonable Corporal Punishment and Abuse, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 114-
17(Spring 2010). 
 6. Elizabeth T. Gershoff, Corporal Punishment by Parents and Associated Child Behaviors and 
Experiences: A Meta-Analytic and Theoretical Review, 128 PSYCHOL. BULL. 539, 540 (2002); see also 
Howard Davidson, The Legal Aspects of Corporal Punishment in the Home: When Does Physical 
Discipline Cross the Line to Become Child Abuse?, 17 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 18 (1997). 
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also say that the punishment must be “appropriate”7 or “moderate,”8 but, in 
practice, these terms are just as difficult to evaluate as “reasonable.” Such vague 
standards have left the task of sorting out individual cases of parental behavior 
to the courts,9 and the lack of guidance has led them to make inconsistent, and 
often shocking, rulings.10 
Fortunately, the idea of “reasonableness” has begun to take more-definitive 
shape in both legislatures and courtrooms in recent years. Progress is being 
made to better define what behavior is acceptable for parents and, conversely, 
what conduct can be justifiably prohibited and punished by the state. More 
states are delineating what, in their view, can never be reasonable. Some states 
have clarified the standard by developing a list of illustrative prohibited acts. 
Statutes in Delaware, the District of Columbia, and Minnesota, for example, 
state that punitive force is not justified if it involves such behavior as throwing 
or kicking the child, or striking the child with a closed fist.11 In Washington, it is 
“presumed unreasonable” to “[do] any other act that is likely to cause and 
which does cause bodily harm greater than transient pain or minor temporary 
marks.”12 Such statutory specifications place more-concrete boundaries on 
courts while empowering them to condemn conduct they may have previously 
felt bound to respect as the privileged acts of parents. 
Other states have listed objective factors that courts must consider in 
individual cases, such as the degree and severity of the child’s injury,13 the 
manner of discipline or use of an instrument,14 and the frequency of discipline.15 
These statutes enable courts to consider the propriety of punishment and to 
address improper action whenever the specific action of the parent alone may 
 
 7. These states include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, and Colorado. See ALA. CODE § 13A-3-24 
(2009); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.430 (2009); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-403 (2009); COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 18-1-703 (2009). 
 8. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 468 (2009); D.C. CODE § 16-2301 (2009); MINN. STAT. § 626.556 
(2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-18-5 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.16.100 (LexisNexis 
2009). 
 9. Many other system actors must heed these standards as well, such as parents, school personnel, 
and child-protective services. But because the courts are the ultimate arbiters in most cases, this 
discussion will be limited to those who must make legal, as opposed to practical, determinations. 
 10. See Sheila McLaughlin, Judge Rules Bare-Bottom Spanking of Girl, 14, by Man Okay, 
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Jan. 17, 2003, available at http://nospank.net/n-j87.htm; Stuart Pfeifer & 
Jennifer Mena, Burning Son’s Hand Gets Dad $100 Fine, L.A. TIMES, April 27, 2002, available at 
http://latimes.perfectmarket.com/2002/apr/27/local/me-burn27. 
 11. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 468 (2009); D.C. CODE § 16-2301 (2009); MINN. STAT. § 626.556 
(2009). 
 12. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.16.100 (LexisNexis 2009) (emphasis added). 
 13. See, e.g., T.G. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 927 So. 2d 104, 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) 
(citing FLA. STAT. § 39.01(30)(a)4 (2005) (noting that, to constitute abuse, the discipline must be 
“inappropriate or excessively harsh” and “likely to result in physical, mental, or emotional injury”). 
 14. See, e.g., In re Rogers, No. 12-89-5, 1989 WL 98423, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 24, 1989) 
(discussing how paddling with a board falls within the prohibitions of the state’s statutes). 
 15. See, e.g., In re O.C., 934 So. 2d 623, 628 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (looking for “evidence of a 
pattern of excessive punishment”). 
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not have been sufficient reason to intervene. They also encourage courts to look 
to a wider variety of circumstances in a given case. 
These steps are beneficial, but they are not enough. Reasonableness cannot 
simply be viewed in a vacuum; evaluation cannot be based merely on the 
circumstances of the force used. Instead, conduct must be reasonable in light of 
the reasons our society allows parents to use corporal punishment in the first 
place. 
III 
THE PURPOSES AND GOALS OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 
Parents have two intertwined childrearing goals: developing their children’s 
“moral character and optimal competence. Character is what it takes to will the 
good, and competence is what it takes to do good well.”16 Discipline is a primary 
way that parents accomplish these goals. Discipline begins early on, but the 
need for it continues and changes from the time a child is a toddler to when the 
child becomes an adult. Children must be free to grow and learn for themselves, 
but discipline is needed to teach them age-appropriate behavior and self-
control. The purpose of discipline is about competence and character: “to 
encourage moral, physical, and intellectual development and a sense of 
responsibility in children.”17 The goal of discipline, whatever the method, is to 
set reasonable limits that protect children from harm and teach them what is 
safe, right, and acceptable. Parents’ use of discipline is thus considered 
important and necessary for the well-being of the child. 
Some state statutes reflect these purposes by expressly limiting corporal 
punishment to only those acts that further these important goals. Alaska begins 
its definition of accepted conduct with “[w]hen and to the extent reasonably 
necessary and appropriate to promote the welfare of the child.”18 Similar 
provisions are included in the laws of Arizona, Arkansas, and Colorado.19 South 
Dakota law states that force is lawful only “in the exercise of a lawful authority 
to restrain or correct the child . . . and if restraint or correction has been 
rendered necessary by the misconduct of the child.”20 Delaware’s law goes even 
further: the force must be “used for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting 
the welfare of the child, including the prevention or punishment of 
misconduct[,] and the force used [must be] intended to benefit the child.”21 Note 
that none of the statutes mentioned here conditions justification on whether the 
 
 16. Diana Baumrind, The Discipline Controversy Revisited, 45:4 FAM. REL. 405, 406 (1996). 
 17. Newsroom, AMERICAN HUMANE ASSOCIATION, http://www.americanhumane.org/about-
us/newsroom/fact-sheets/child-discipline.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2010) (citing Committee for Children 
(2004)).  
 18. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.430 (2009). 
 19. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-403 (2009), ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-2-605 (2009), COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 18-1-703 (2009). 
 20. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-18-5 (2009). 
 21. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 468 (2009) (emphasis added). 
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parent “believed” his or her actions to be necessary for such goals.22 Instead, the 
actions, when viewed objectively, must actually be related to those ends.23 
Other states reflect this limitation in their case law. For example, in 
Maryland, force is privileged only if it is intended to punish and discipline “for 
the betterment of the child or promotion of the child’s welfare.”24 An Illinois 
case specified that an ordinary spanking could be the basis of a child-abuse 
charge if it was “for other than disciplinary reasons.”25 Finally, South Dakota 
employs a two-pronged analysis for whether parental action falls within the 
corporal-punishment exception, the first of which is whether the action was a 
“corrective measure” that was “rendered necessary” by the child’s actions.26 
As the reasons behind corporal punishment of children are brought into 
focus, an important limiting concept becomes apparent: the child must be able 
to learn from it—it must do some good. Either in pursuit of such a limiting 
concept, or in the name of it, governments are beginning to discuss an 
additional limitation on reasonable corporal punishment: the child’s age. 
IV 
WHEN AGE MATTERS 
As all three branches of government struggle with how to account for the 
child’s age in the corporal-punishment context, two distinct approaches have 
emerged: The first requires that age be a factor in assessing reasonableness, but 
preserves the process of case-by-case analysis. The second approach is one of 
prohibition, proscribing physical punishment based on age distinctions alone. 
These prohibitions are most often seen for the punishment of children under 
the age of three or four or, more rarely, over a certain age at adolescence. 
Though recent, action reflecting these approaches has been taken in legislative, 
judicial, and even executive contexts. 
A. Age as a Factor 
Several states have begun to consider age as a factor in deciding whether to 
classify corporal punishment as reasonable or abusive through legislative, 
executive, or judicial action. 
 
 22. But see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-18 (2008) (demonstrating a common practice of making 
judgments contingent upon the parent’s subjective belief); State v. Matavale, 166 P.3d 322 (Haw. 2007) 
(noting that the former state statute, HAW. REV. STAT. §703-309 (1985), reflected a policy choice not to 
review the reasonableness of parents’ judgment in these matters “so long as a parent uses moderate 
force for permissible purposes”). 
 23. See Coleman et al., supra note 5, at 117-18. In contrast to these statutes, other states require 
merely that parents believe that the situation warrants corporal punishment: a limitation of good faith. 
These statutes, however, neither adequately further the purposes of discipline nor protect children from 
parents’ erroneous perceptions, so they are not discussed here as examples of improved standards. Id. 
 24. Anderson v. State, 487 A.2d 294, 298 & n.10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (holding that a purpose 
of punishment is a “necessary precondition” to privileged action). 
 25. In re Aaronson, 382 N.E.2d 853, 855 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978). 
 26. People ex rel. C.F., 708 N.W.2d 313, 317 (S.D. 2005). 
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Many state laws refer explicitly to the age of the child as a factor in 
evaluating whether the punishment constitutes acceptable corporal punishment. 
For example, Hawaii law specifies that parental force is acceptable if it “is 
employed with due regard for the age and size of the minor and is reasonably 
related to the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the minor, 
including the prevention or punishment of the minor’s misconduct.”27 Similarly, 
Washington law specifies that “the age, size, and condition of the child . . . shall 
be considered when determining whether the bodily harm is reasonable or 
moderate.”28 Maryland has similar laws.29 Minnesota takes a different approach, 
providing specifically that “[a]ctions which are not reasonable . . . include, but 
are not limited to, any of the following that are done in anger or without regard 
to the safety of the child: . . . shaking a child under age three . . . [or] striking a 
child under age one on the face or head.”30 
Executive officials are also beginning to invoke age for consideration. 
California’s attorney general, for example, suggested that age is relevant to 
assessing corporal-punishment cases. The relevant statute, Penal Code Section 
273, does not define reasonableness. When asked whether parents could 
permissibly spank a child with an object, the attorney general issued an opinion 
that went beyond the question asked. It first cited case law to explain that 
acceptable parental discipline required an analysis of two parts: the need for the 
punishment and whether the degree of the punishment was “reasonable or 
excessive.”31 Yet the attorney general then referenced a separate section of the 
California Code—Welfare and Institutions—which did specify that the 
“physical harm” that would warrant removal of children from a home does not 
include “reasonable and age-appropriate spanking to the buttocks.”32 By 
specifically referring to this “age-appropriate” standard in the opinion, the 
attorney general made age a factor in assessing the punishment’s 
reasonableness for purposes of the criminal code, even though the criminal 
statute never took that step.33 
Courts also consider age a relevant factor in distinguishing reasonable 
corporal punishment from child abuse.34 A Connecticut case, Smith v. Hamilton, 
is representative of such cases.35 In Smith, the court set forth factors to consider 
in making a reasonableness finding, which included “the necessity for discipline, 
 
 27. HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-309 (2009). 
 28. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.16.100 (LexisNexis 2009). 
 29. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-501 (West 2009). 
 30. MINN. STAT. § 626.556 (2009) (emphasis added). Though the statute lists acts that are “not 
reasonable” based on the child’s age, the law only prohibits these actions taken in anger or without 
regard to safety; therefore, the statute’s effect is to make age a factor, not to create an age-based 
prohibition. 
 31. 80 Op. Cal. Att’y Gen. 203 (1997). 
 32. Id. (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West 2009)) (emphasis added). 
 33. 80 Op. Cal. Att’y Gen. 203 (1997). 
 34. See, e.g., Cox v. State, 1 So. 3d 1220, 1222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
 35. Smith v. Hamilton, No. 07-4015735, 2008 WL 5481173 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 1, 2008). 
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looking to the welfare of the child; the motive of the parent[;] the type of 
punishment; the amount of force used; and the child’s age, size and ability to 
understand the punishment.”36 Similarly, the Virginia Supreme Court held that 
“a parent has the right to administer such reasonable and timely punishment as 
may be necessary to correct faults in his growing children.”37 In assessing this 
standard, the court mentioned several factors, including the child’s age, size, 
and conduct.38 
When age is explicitly used as a factor, it can be determinative. For example, 
in United States v. Arnold,39 a case before the United States Air Force Court of 
Military Review, the defendant was convicted of assault on his infant son. The 
court upheld the conviction, reasoning that “the [child’s] age, the physical and 
mental condition, its size, and its understanding should be considered. 
Sometimes a great deal of force may be used. In other cases, less force is 
appropriate.”40 Applying this standard, the court held that shaking the infant for 
a minute was “clearly excessive, given the age, size, and physical and mental 
condition of the victim,”41 so the defense of discipline was inapplicable.42 
Whether formalized in a statute, propounded by an executive officer, or 
incorporated by the courts, the common denominator of these uses of the age 
factor is that the child’s age is an important component in assessing the 
appropriateness of a parent’s actions, but the determination is still made 
through a case-by-case analysis. 
B. Age as a Prohibition 
The second category of age limitations includes measures that prohibit all 
corporal punishment of children within certain age ranges. Such prohibitions 
have been considered by both legislators and courts.43 
1. Statutory Prohibitions 
Various legislatures have introduced bills that would use age as a 
prohibition. Such statutes would forbid all corporal punishment on children 
below or above certain ages. The most recent attempt at such a prohibition 
occurred in the California legislature in 2007. California Assemblywoman Sally 
Lieber drafted an anti-spanking bill that would have made it a criminal 
 
 36. Id. at *4. 
 37. Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 44 S.E.2d 419, 423 (Va. 1947). 
 38. Id. at 423–24. 
 39. 40 M.J. 744, 744 (A.F.C.M.R. 1994). 
 40. Id. at 746. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. The choice to use age as a prohibition is much less prominent in U.S. law than abroad, but 
there are signs that the United States is beginning to respond to international efforts in this area, or is 
at least becoming conscious of them. Therefore, laws using age as a prohibition elsewhere are 
important to discuss. 
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misdemeanor to spank a child three years of age or under.44 The bill’s 
introductory section explained its motivation: 
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that child abuse is a major social problem 
and that children in the age group of birth to three years suffer the highest rate of 
victimization. Child fatalities are the most tragic consequence of maltreatment, and 
the vast majority of children killed are younger than four years old. Fatal abuse is too 
often the result of hitting or shaking by caregivers under the guise of discipline. Infants 
and toddlers are the most vulnerable because of their tender age and inability to 
defend themselves or ask for help. It is therefore wholly reasonable that the integrity 
and sanctity of their bodies should be afforded the greatest protection possible under 
the law.45 
The bill did not propose a reasonableness standard, but would have made it 
a violation to use any amount of force on children three and under. It did not 
differentiate between kinds of contact, kinds of behavior being punished, or 
kinds of injury that occurred. Instead, corporal punishment of a child age three 
or younger would be per se child abuse. The bill went on to specify that 
violations would be made punishable by requiring the parent to take child-
rearing classes, by fines, or by the parent’s being sentenced to up to a year in 
jail.46 When it eventually became clear that her bill would not pass a vote,47 
Lieber abandoned it and introduced a more “modest proposal,” which did not 
include the age-based prohibition.48 Yet even the amended proposal was met 
with staunch opposition and was defeated.49 Had the original bill been passed, it 
would have been the first state law to ban corporal punishment in the home, 
albeit for a certain subgroup of children.50 
Efforts to pass age-based prohibitions have occurred internationally as well. 
In 2002, the Scottish Executive announced broad plans regarding the criminal 
laws on child discipline. The catalyst for this move was a decision out of the 
European Court of Human Rights. In that case, a nine-year-old boy was beaten 
with a three-foot cane by his stepfather, but the stepfather was cleared when an 
English court found the chastisement was reasonable. On appeal, the Court of 
Human Rights reversed, ruling that the man was guilty of assault, and that 
English law had failed to protect the boy from “inhuman or degrading 
treatment.”51 
 
 44. Jennifer Steinhauer, A Proposal to Ban Spanking Sparks Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2007, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/21/us/21spank.html. 
 45. A.B. 755, 2007–2008 Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Jesse McKinley, Lawmaker Ends Effort to Make Spanking a Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2007, 
at A15. 
 48. Tracy Press, Lawmaker Drops Unpopular Effort to Ban Spanking in California, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Feb. 23, 2007, available at http://www.nospank.net/n-q70r.htm. 
 49. Id. 
 50. McKinley, supra note 47. 
 51. A. v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 959 (1998), available at http://www.cirp.org/library/legal/ 
A_v_UK1998. 
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The case caused England and Wales also to reconsider the standards within 
their corporal punishment statutes,52 but Scotland took it further. The Scottish 
bill included some changes directly applicable to the case, such as a ban on the 
use of implements in corporal punishment and a total ban on blows to the 
head.53 Yet the bill also added an age prohibition: under its original terms, any 
physical punishment of children under the age of three would be a criminal 
offense. Some parts of the bill were met with wide agreement and public 
approval, but the age-based prohibition sparked much controversy.54 A 
parliamentary committee conducted research and public polling and issued a 
report of its conclusions.55 The report consisted of qualitative interviews as well 
as a quantitative survey designed to provide data on the prevalence of certain 
views and behaviors. Most of the parents interviewed in the study felt that 
spanking was still widespread, if not universal, among Scottish parents. “In 
other words, it tends to be seen as a ‘normal’ part of parenting, rather than as 
an exceptional practice.”56 Furthermore, seventy-seven percent of parents of 
children between the ages of three and five reported using physical 
chastisement within the last year.57 Approximately one-fifth of parents who had 
children under five reported using it in the previous week. A majority of those 
who used physical discipline saw it as either “fairly” or “very” effective in 
stopping the child’s behavior at that time and in preventing similar behavior 
later.58 
The results of the study sent the committee a clear message against the 
proposed age-based prohibition. Views were mixed on whether children under 
certain ages should be “smacked,” but even more importantly, the results 
revealed that a belief that “children of a certain age should not be smacked is 
not the same as saying that it should be illegal to do so.”59 Only one-third of 
those surveyed said they would support a ban on physical punishment of 
children under three, and the committee found “of those who currently smack 
[children under three], there was little evidence that parents would greatly 
modify their behaviour in response to a ban.”60 The report revealed widespread 
support for other parts of the bill, but declined to recommend the age 
prohibition. “The committee strongly supports any measures that will reduce 
harm to, or abuse of, children,” one committee member stated, “but we do not 
 
 52. Tom Peterkin & Nicole Martin, Prison for Smacking a Toddler, TELEGRAPH, Sept. 7, 2001, 
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1339781/Prison-for-smacking-a-toddler.html. 
 53. Criminal Justice Bill, 2002, Bill [50] (Scot.), available at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/ 
business/bills/billsPassed/b50s1.pdf.  
 54. Peterkin & Martin, supra note 52. 
 55. See SIMON ANDERSON ET AL., DISCIPLINING CHILDREN: RESEARCH WITH PARENTS IN 
SCOTLAND (2002), available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/cru/kd01/blue/dcrp.pdf. 
 56. Id. at 28. 
 57. Id. at 21. 
 58. Id. at 43. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 56. 
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wish to see an increase in the prosecution of parents for moderate physical 
punishment.”61 Ultimately, a majority of the committee members felt that such a 
law would not reduce harm to children to the degree necessary to justify its 
enforcement.62 
After the committee refused to support the bill, its sponsor recommended to 
the cabinet that the age element be dropped, but stated that “we will of course 
continue to pursue a range of measures to further protect young children from 
physical abuse.”63 After the under-three ban was dropped, most of the bill’s 
other provisions ultimately passed. 
Though the broad age-defined prohibitions attempted in Scotland and 
California have not yet made their way into American law, some jurisdictions 
have begun to use similar definitions. For example, the District of Columbia 
explicitly lists “nonaccidental injury to a child under the age of 18 months” as 
child abuse.64 The meaning of this language is unclear—and whether this means 
“injury” in the sense of physical contact and pain, or “injury” in terms of lasting 
harm, matters dramatically. 
2. Judicial Prohibitions 
At least one age-based prohibition has been created by judicial, instead of 
legislative, action. In 2004, the Supreme Court of Canada addressed a 
constitutional challenge to the nation’s corporal-punishment law. The statute, 
section 43 of the Criminal Code, simply stated that “[e]very schoolteacher, 
parent or person standing in the place of a parent is justified in using force by 
way of correction toward a pupil or child . . . if the force does not exceed what is 
reasonable under the circumstances.”65 The statute was a carve-out provision 
similar to some American laws that provide a corporal-punishment defense to 
what would otherwise be considered child abuse. 
The decision ultimately upheld the child-abuse statute, finding that the 
“reasonable” standard was not unconstitutionally vague. To support this 
holding, however, the court undertook an extensive discussion of what is 
“reasonable,” and in doing so, announced an entirely new rule. The chief 
justice, writing for the majority, ruled out the use of corporal punishment for 
children under the age of two and for teenagers. The decision also prohibited 
the use of instruments and declared that corporal punishment by teachers was 
unacceptable—regardless of what the statute said. “[Acceptable corporal 
punishment] requires that the child be capable of actually learning from the 
physical force,” the court explained. “Accordingly, the defence does not 
 
 61. Paul Kelbie, Scots Move to Outlaw Smacking is Abandoned, INDEPENDENT, Sept. 14, 2002, 
available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/scots-move-to-outlaw-smacking-is-
abandoned-642713.html. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Smacking Ban Thrown Out, BBC NEWS, Sept. 13, 2002, available at 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/Scotland/2254644.stm. 
 64. D.C. CODE § 16-2301 (2009). 
 65. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-46. 
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operate where the child is under the age of two[,] . . . as on the evidence those 
children are incapable of understanding the reason why they are hit.”66 The 
court further concluded that “[a] consensus of the evidence before the court 
indicated that corporal punishment of teenagers is harmful and thus 
unreasonable, because it can induce aggressive or antisocial behaviour.”67 The 
result was that the “reasonable” standard remained, but with added 
prohibitions of physical punishment on children under age two or on teenagers. 
In its reasoning and holding, the country’s highest court had successfully taken a 
statute requiring case-by-case analysis and carved out blanket prohibitions at 
both ends of the age spectrum. 
V 
SHOULD AGE MATTER? 
As jurisdictions work to distinguish reasonable corporal punishment from 
child abuse, the age of the child has become an increasingly important criterion. 
But the question remains: Should it be? It is important to assess whether the use 
of age at all is justified, and if so, how. There appears to be little disagreement 
about the use of age as a factor in the analysis. There is quite a bit of 
disagreement, however, about whether it is appropriate to ban corporal 
punishment of children in certain age ranges. Most of the attention in this area 
has focused on bans or proposed bans of corporal punishment of children under 
the age of three. Some attention has also been paid to the notion of banning 
corporal punishment of adolescents. Because of the Canadian Supreme Court’s 
opinion on this point, it is likely that this issue will become of increasing interest 
in the future. 
A. Limits on Punishment of Children Three and Under 
Proponents of limiting or banning corporal punishment of children three 
and under articulate three rationales. These include (1) progress toward a wider 
corporal-punishment ban, (2) concerns about the efficacy and propriety of 
physical punishment, and (3) the risk that corporal punishment will escalate 
into abuse. 
1. Age-Related Limitations as Progress Toward a Complete Ban 
One motivation—sometimes candidly admitted—for limiting or banning 
corporal punishment based on age is one of “means to an end.” Many people 
believe that corporal punishment of any kind is unjustified and therefore should 
not be allowed under any circumstances.68 Those who oppose all corporal 
punishment often see these age limitations as one giant step toward an ultimate 
 
 66. Canadian Found. for Children, Youth & the Law v. Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 (Can.). 
 67. Id. 
 68. See generally STRAUS, supra note 1 (arguing that all corporal punishment is a major 
psychological and social problem). 
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goal of outlawing corporal punishment altogether.69 Therefore, the arguments in 
favor of a total ban must be assessed in order to determine whether this end 
goal justifies the incremental step of an age-related prohibition. 
Leading proponents have published many academic articles, detailing their 
findings and serious concerns. In 2002, for example, Elizabeth Thompson 
Gershoff published a meta-analysis of several corporal-punishment studies.70 
She concluded that corporal punishment is mentally harmful to children and 
leads to aggression and delinquency later in life.71 Pointing to findings of 
psychological harm,72 ineffectiveness,73 and increased antisocial behavior,74 she 
and other advocates argue that corporal punishment should be banned 
entirely.75 
Much of the research cited in each of these studies to support the broad 
conclusion that corporal punishment places a child at risk for maladjustment, 
however, came from research on children who had endured physical abuse,76 
which all researchers agree does have negative effects. As a result, the studies 
do not provide a basis from which to understand the effects of moderate 
corporal punishment. Additionally, proponents of bans rely on studies that 
“suffer[ ] from other such serious methodological limitations as oversampling, 
reliance on clinic populations, shared method variance, and failure to use 
contrast groups or to control for the child’s tendency to misbehave.”77 
In a reply article to Gershoff, several leading researchers, including Diana 
Baumrind and Robert Larzelere, wrote that because the original studies in 
 
 69. See, e.g., Gary Palmer, Child Spanking is Discipline, Not a Form of Abuse, TUSCALOOSA 
NEWS, Feb. 4, 2007, available at http://www.corpun.com/usd00702.htm (“We would all like a perfect 
world . . . where we just stopped hitting children. In the imperfect world, you sometimes have to do 
things incrementally.”); Latest Developments, Scotland Debates Legislation to Ban Smacking for All 
Children Under Three (March 2002), http://www.endcorporalpunishment.org/pages/news/scotland.html 
(“[T]his is a large step towards the end of all corporal punishment of children throughout the UK.”). 
For the debate based on researchers’ meta-analyses of available data concerning corporal punishment, 
see generally Elizabeth T. Gershoff, More Harm than Good: A Summary of Scientific Research on the 
Intended and Unintended Effects of Corporal Punishment on Children, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.  
31 (Spring 2010) [hereinafter Gershoff, More Harm than Good]; Larzelere & Baumrind, Are Spanking 
Injunctions Scientifically Supported?, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57 (Spring 2010); Murray A. Straus, 
Prevalence, Societal Causes, and Trends in Corporal Punishment by Parents in World Perspective, 73 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Spring 2010). 
 70. Gershoff, supra note 6. 
 71. Id. at 544. A meta-analysis is an empirical research synthesis, in this case “linking corporal 
punishment to specific child outcomes by statistically combining existing data to discern the average 
strength of the findings.” Gershoff, More Harm than Good, supra note 69, at 33. 
 72. See STRAUS, supra note 1. 
 73. IRWIN A. HYMAN, THE CASE AGAINST SPANKING: HOW TO DISCIPLINE YOUR CHILD 
WITHOUT HITTING 70 (1997) (pointing to “high rates of misbehavior, disruption, and violence”). 
 74. Gershoff, supra note 6, at 544. 
 75. See generally STRAUS, supra note 1; HYMAN, supra note 73. 
 76. Diana Baumrind, Necessary Distinctions, 8 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 176, 177 (1997) (citing Robert 
E. Larzelere, A Review of the Outcomes of Parental Use of Nonabusive or Customary Physical 
Punishment, 98 PEDIATRICS 824 (1996) [hereinafter Larzelere, Review]); see also Larzelere & 
Baumrind, supra note 69. 
 77. Baumrind, supra note 76. 
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Gershoff’s analysis included instances of extreme or excessive physical 
punishment, her finding is not an evaluation of normative corporal punishment 
and cannot properly be weighed as such. “The evidence presented in [the] 
meta-analysis does not justify a blanket injunction against mild to moderate 
disciplinary spanking.”78 
Experts on both sides, including Gershoff, caution that the negative findings 
do not imply that most children who experience corporal punishment turn out 
to be aggressive or delinquent.79 The most salient predictors of the effects of 
corporal punishment are a host of situational factors, such as the parent–child 
relationship,80 frequency and severity of punishment,81 means of punishment,82 
social support,83 characteristics of the misbehavior,84 and goals of the parent,85 to 
name just a few. Therefore, studying the true effects of corporal punishment as 
a general means requires drawing those important distinctions, including a 
boundary line between punishment and abuse. This is difficult to do, especially 
when relying on parents’ self-reports of their disciplinary methods. It is 
impossible to do when researchers refuse to refine these distinctions because of 
their desire to reach a predetermined conclusion. As two organizers of an 
American Academy of Pediatrics conference on spanking admitted, “We must 
confess that we had a preconceived notion that corporal punishment, including 
spanking, was innately and always ‘bad.’”86 
Instead, recent evidence suggests the contrary. Some studies indicate that 
corporal punishment, when used properly, serves its purposes better than 
alternative means of discipline. Researchers suggest that parents using corporal 
punishment achieve positive results when they are communicative and 
affectionate, but firm.87 In 1996, Larzelere published the results of a sweeping 
review of spanking research. Rejecting studies with procedural flaws, and 
excluding instances in which overly severe or abusive punishment was present, 
the study failed to find any convincing evidence that typical spanking damaged 
children. Faced with this and other similar studies, even proponents of spanking 
bans have acknowledged that “given a relatively ‘healthy’ family life in a 
 
 78. Diana Baumrind, Robert E. Larzelere & Philip A. Cowan, Ordinary Physical Punishment: Is It 
Harmful? Comment on Gershoff (2002), 128 PSYCHOL. BULL. 580, 586 (2002). 
 79. Gershoff, supra note 6, at 551. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 552; Baumrind et al., supra note 78, at 584. 
 82. Baumrind et al., supra note 78, at 581. 
 83. Gershoff, supra note 6, at 561. 
 84. Id. at 556; Thomas F. Catron & John C. Masters, Mothers’ and Children’s Conceptualizations of 
Corporal Punishment, 64 CHILD DEV. 1815, 1815 (1993). 
 85. Gershoff, supra note 6, at 550. 
 86. Lynn Rosellini & Anna Mulrine, When to Spank, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 5, 1998, 
available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/culture/articles/980413/archive_003698_5.htm. 
 87. Joan E. Grusec & Jacqueline J. Goodnow, Impact of Parental Discipline Methods on the Child’s 
Internalization of Values: A Reconceptualization of Current Points of View, 30 DEVELOPMENTAL 
PSYCHOL. 4, 5–6 (1994). 
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supportive environment, spanking in and of itself is not detrimental to a child or 
predictive of later problems.”88 
In fact, Larzelere’s study revealed that spanking, when used appropriately, 
had more beneficial results for young children than any other discipline 
technique—including timeout, reasoning, or withdrawal of privileges.89 Even 
Gershoff does not deny the efficacy of some corporal punishment for certain 
purposes: “There is general consensus that corporal punishment is effective in 
getting children to comply immediately . . . .”90 But more importantly, parents 
themselves report that spankings are helpful in their discipline as well.91 The 
case for a ban is made more difficult if corporal punishment is truly helpful 
when used properly; therefore, the debate continues.92 
Any accurate measure of the efficacy or the harms of corporal punishment 
will depend on consideration of several variables. Therefore, isolation and 
further study regarding which punishment characteristics lead to beneficial 
outcomes can help parents use discipline effectively. Such studies have already 
determined that certain discipline techniques, including spanking, are effective 
in furthering children’s internalization of values and moral behavior. 
Completely removing parents’ ability to choose corporal punishment is too 
extreme when the harms are inconclusive, and the benefits still arguably exist.93 
The salience of situational factors supports the consideration of age as a factor 
in any specific case. But since a complete ban is not warranted, the pursuit of 
one should not serve as justification for an age-based ban. 
2. The Efficacy and Propriety of Corporal Punishment for Children Three 
and Under 
The second, and perhaps most widely held, rationale for limiting or banning 
corporal punishment of young children is that such punishment is not justified 
from an efficacy or propriety standpoint. Essentially, the concerns here are two-
 
 88. Rosellini & Mulrine, supra note 86. 
 89. Larzelere, Review, supra note 76, at 825. 
 90. Gershoff, supra note 6, at 549. 
 91. Anthony M. Graziano & Karen A. Namaste, Parental Use of Physical Force in Child Discipline, 
5 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 449, 456 (1990) (reporting that a majority of the respondents thought 
their use of spankings was usually “helpful” to “very helpful”). 
 92. Concededly, the “ideal” environment is not always present for children, and not all parents use 
corporal punishment in the way experts agree it “should” be used. In reality, the real debate is between 
those who think corporal punishment is acceptable and beneficial under certain conditions, and 
therefore should be allowed in those circumstances, and those who believe a ban is warranted for all 
because of the variation in use. Ultimately, however, the data does not warrant a ban on corporal 
punishment, and in fact, indicates that it can do some good. See generally Diana Baumrind, A Blanket 
Injunction Against Disciplinary Use of Spanking is Not Warranted by the Data, 98:4:2 PEDIATRICS 828 
(1996). 
 93. See generally David Benatar, Corporal Punishment, 24:2 SOC. THEORY & PRACTICE 237 (1998) 
(discussing the anti-spanking arguments from a philosopher’s perspective). Benatar analyzes the 
suggestions that corporal punishment is degrading, psychologically damaging, etc. He demonstrates 
that these arguments fail for lack of evidence or are logically unsound. 
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fold. First, does it work? And second, is it appropriate from a developmental-
harm perspective? 
Proponents of bans like the ones in California and Scotland argue that 
corporal punishment fails from an efficacy standpoint: it does not produce 
learning or internalization of behavior in children under the age of four.94 The 
concern is that young children are unable to associate the punishment with their 
actions and therefore cannot alter their behavior because of the attempted 
discipline. This is a reason given by those who mounted the legislative attempt 
in Scotland,95 as well as the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court of Canada 
in Canadian Foundation.96 
Proponents of a ban argue that corporal punishment fails from a propriety 
perspective as well, saying it creates physical and psychological harms. This 
argument is supported by broader studies of corporal punishment discussed 
elsewhere in this issue,97 though there is very little evidence that corporal 
punishment may be more psychologically harmful to children three and under 
than to those who are older. Neither the American Academy of Pediatrics nor 
child-development specialists believe that spanking should be the sole or 
preferred means of child discipline, or that it should be administered when a 
parent is very angry. Along with these limitations, such specialists sometimes 
hold that it should not be used with adolescents or with children under two 
years old.98 
The efficacy of any discipline during those first years matters. Far from 
being too early to be a concern, “the interests of many scholars have shifted to 
toddlerhood and early childhood, now increasingly recognized as the critical 
context for the origins of morality.”99 Therefore, the spanking controversy is an 
important real-life dilemma for parents as well, and proposals to ban the 
practice for very young children do not resolve this dilemma. In fact, most 
parents use the practice more often during the first years of a child’s life. One 
study found that mothers of two-year-olds had to interrupt their children every 
 
 94. See generally Martin Hoffman, Affective and Cognitive Processes in Moral Internalization, in 
SOCIAL COGNITION AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: A SOCIOCULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 236 (Tory E. 
Higgins, Diane N. Ruble & Willard W. Hartup eds., 1983). 
 95. Peterkin & Martin, supra note 52 (quoting Justice Minister Wallace saying, “Up to this age, it is 
very doubtful that a child would understand why he or she was being punished . . . .”). 
 96. Canadian Found. for Children, Youth, & the Law v. Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 (Can.). 
Interestingly, it is not at all clear what “the evidence” was that the court referred to, which created such 
a “consensus” as to warrant this conclusion. The decision cited to the plaintiffs’ brief, but that 
document only referred to this type of evidence in passing. Far from presenting a consensus, the 
evidence before the court included the testimony of the defense experts who were the very scholars 
known for their work defending the efficacy of corporal punishment. 
 97. Gershoff, supra note 6; Larzelere & Baumrind, supra note 69; see also Gershoff, supra note 6 at 
549–50; Kirby Deater-Deckard et al., Physical Discipline Among African American and European 
American Mothers: Links to Children’s Externalizing Behaviors, 32 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1065, 
1065–72 (1996). 
 98. Rosellini & Mulrine, supra note 86. 
 99. Grazyna Kochanska, Multiple Pathways to Conscience for Children with Different 
Temperaments: From Toddlerhood to Age 5, 33 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 228, 228 (1997). 
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six to eight minutes to alter their behavior.100 The frequency of incidents of 
negative behavior peaks during the “terrible twos,” and physical aggression and 
oppositional behavior peak around the age of thirty months.101 Other discipline 
problems grow and continue through the end of the preschool years. Parents of 
these young children often find that in dangerous or repeat instances an 
appropriate spanking is the best discipline available.102 
One major concern with a ban on physical punishment of young children is 
that it does not merely punish or criminalize the actions of a few parents, or of 
those in an extreme minority; instead, it prohibits actions approved of, and even 
taken, by the vast majority of parents. In 1995, for example, ninety-four percent 
of American parents of three- and four-year-old children reported using 
physical punishment at least occasionally.103 Despite the peaks of negative 
behavior during the toddler years and the widespread use of corporal 
punishment by parents during this time, “the data are limited and surprisingly 
little attention has been paid to the way in which age might have an effect.”104 
The data that do exist support these parents’ reports that corporal 
punishment for young children is effective. Research indicates that reference to 
the physical consequences of misbehavior (that is, spanking) produces greater 
suppression of behavior in four-year-olds than reference to more-abstract 
notions.105 Yet the same research shows that the discussions of abstract 
notions—respect and propriety, for example—do produce those favorable 
results once children reach the age of seven.106 Similarly, reasoning is more likely 
to be associated with advanced moral development only in children seven years 
of age and older.107 Younger children are not as likely to understand their 
parents’ reasoning or more-complex forms of punishment. Yet parents cannot 
wait until their children are much older to begin training them about what is 
unacceptable, what is wrong, and even what is dangerous. A simple and fleeting 
physical punishment can be understood by children who are two, three, or four 
years of age. 
Not only can such a punishment help to teach children in this age group 
appropriate behavior when discussion may not be effective, but studies 
 
 100. Cheryl Minton, Jerome Kagan & Janet A. Levine, Maternal Control and Obedience in the Two-
Year-Old, 42 CHILD DEV. 1873–94 (1971). 
 101. Robert Larzelere, Thomas G. Amberson & Julie A. Martin, Age Differences in Perceived 
Discipline Problems from 9 to 48 Months, 41 FAM. REL. 192, 196 (1992). 
 102. Minton et al., supra note 100. 
 103. Murray A. Straus & Julie H. Stewart, Corporal Punishment by American Parents: National 
Data on Prevalence, Chronicity, Severity, and Duration, in Relation to Child and Family Characteristics, 
2 CLINICAL CHILD & FAM. PSYCHOL. REV. 55, 55 (1999). 
 104. Grusec & Goodnow, supra note 87, at 11. 
 105. See Ross D. Parke, Rules, Roles, and Resistance to Deviation: Recent Advances in Punishment, 
Discipline, and Self-Control, in MINNESOTA SYMPOSIA ON CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 111, 115–18 (A. Pick 
ed., vol. 8, 1974). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Gene Brody & David Shaffer, Contributions of Parents and Peers to Children’s Moral 
Socialization, 2 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 31, 54–55 (1982). 
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demonstrate that young children evaluate physical punishment by mothers 
more favorably than older children do.108 There is evidence that, far from 
presenting more psychological harm, corporal punishment is associated with 
less negative effects in younger children than in older ones.109 In fact, even the 
studies that find associations between corporal punishment and child aggression 
have found that the association decreases as the age of the child decreases.110 
Overall, far too little study has been devoted to the specific effect of age in 
the corporal-punishment context, but existing evidence and parents’ anecdotal 
experience suggest that it is effective for children three and under—perhaps 
even most effective during this time. Therefore, much greater attention should 
be devoted to the subject before a widespread practice is removed from 
parents’ hands, especially when those parents report that it is working. 
Using age as a factor, instead of a line of demarcation, eliminates the 
overbreadth problem, and allows the use of corporal punishment by many 
parents to receive individualized consideration. If a child cannot associate her 
actions with a punishment—whatever the method—then the method does not 
work as a mode of discipline; it will not teach the child the intended lesson. 
There will be cases in which a child cannot understand the connection. For 
instance, a particular toddler may not understand that he is being punished 
because he called Mommy an ugly word he overheard. But age is merely a 
crude, often inaccurate, proxy for understanding. In many circumstances, even a 
one-year-old child understands why his hand is being swatted away from the 
breakables he has reached for repeatedly. Yet a developmentally slow four-
year-old may not understand when he is allowed to yell and when he is not. Age 
should be a factor allowing courts to consider these individualized 
circumstances—whether a child is capable of learning from the discipline, or 
whether it will instead do him harm. However, spanking111 is effective, proper, 
and sometimes even necessary with children under the age of four. Therefore, a 
law prohibiting all corporal punishment in that range would be inappropriate. 
3. Saving Parents from Themselves 
The last rationale for placing limits on corporal punishment of young 
children is that many “consider physical abuse to be a potential outcome of 
 
 108. Michael Siegel & Jan Cowen, Appraisals of Intervention: The Mother’s Versus the Culprit’s 
Behavior as Determinants of Children’s Evaluations of Discipline Techniques, 55 CHILD DEV. 1760, 
1765 (1984). 
 109. Marjorie L. Gunnoe & Carrie L. Mariner, Toward a Developmental–Contextual Model of the 
Effects of Parental Spanking on Children’s Aggression, 151 ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRIC AND 
ADOLESCENT MED. 768 (1997); Fred Rothbaum & John R. Weisz, Parental Caregiving and Child 
Externalizing Behavior in Nonclinical Samples: A Meta-Analysis, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 55, 62 (1994). 
 110. Gershoff, supra note 6, at 549. 
 111. Spanking should be understood to include only punishments that fit within Murray Straus’s 
definition of corporal punishment: “use of physical force with the intention of causing a child to 
experience pain, but not injury, for the purpose of correction or control of the child’s behavior.” 
STRAUS, supra note 1. 
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corporal punishment.”112 Opponents of corporal punishment view spanking as 
sharing space on the same “continuum” as abuse and believe that parents who 
spank “transform” into parents who abuse.113 This concern, which is clear 
particularly in the recent legislative attempts to limit corporal punishment, is 
one of saving parents from themselves.114 The California bill did not discuss any 
harms of corporal punishment in its preamble, but instead detailed the harms of 
child abuse.115 The banning of the first was assumed to prevent the latter. 
Proponents of this rationale suggest that even if spanking, in and of itself, is not 
harmful, it leads to child abuse and should therefore be disallowed. They think 
that even well-intentioned parents will often use too much force; parents cannot 
be trusted to punish only appropriately, then stop. Therefore, since very young 
children are most at risk of serious harm from this mistake, it is best to simply 
take the option off the table entirely.116 
The problem with this rationale is that it is not supported by the evidence.117 
“Beliefs that there are necessary connections between spanking and . . . parents’ 
escalation to child abuse . . . are strongly held conjectures, no more supported 
by solid empirical evidence than the contrary belief that to spare the rod is to 
spoil the child.”118 
Experts explain that the distinction between corporal punishment and abuse 
is more than simply a natural progression of severity. Instead, the two are 
qualitatively different acts, and parents more likely to resort to abuse often 
share a “distinctive set of attributes” not present in most parents who use 
corporal punishment.119 A common-sense observation reinforces the point. The 
vast majority of parents support or use corporal punishment with their 
children,120 and yet the majority of parents never become physically abusive.121 
This would not be the case if spanking and other moderate corporal punishment 
were simply gateways to inappropriate and dangerous punishment. The 
 
 112. Gershoff, supra note 6. 
 113. See id. at 553 (“[C]orporal punishment and physical abuse are two points along a continuum,” 
and researchers must seek to determine when “corporal punishment is transformed into abuse.”). 
 114. There is no indication that Lieber’s attempt in California was based on social-science research 
or on a belief that corporal punishment of young children was ineffective or psychologically harmful. 
The only indication of the bill’s rationale lies in the introductory section, which seems to suggest that 
the ban was to prevent child fatalities from child abuse within those age groups. For that language, see 
supra text accompanying note 45. 
 115. A.B. 755, 2007–2008 Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007). 
 116. STRAUS, supra note 1, at 116. 
 117. See id. at 263 (“We also could not directly test the part of the model that deals with escalation 
from the use of corporal punishment such as spanking . . . .”). 
 118. Baumrind, supra note 92, at 829. 
 119. Baumrind et al., supra note 78, at 585; see also DIANA BAUMRIND, CHILD MALTREATMENT 
AND OPTIMAL CAREGIVING IN SOCIAL CONTEXTS 76 (1995). 
 120. Straus & Stewart, supra note 103 (finding that ninety-four percent of parents of children three 
to four years of age use corporal punishment). 
 121. Baumrind, supra note 76 (noting that abusive punishment “falls outside the normative range” 
of practice in the United States but that spanking “is normatively used by most parents with young 
children”). 
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Scotland study demonstrates the truth of this point.122 Though a large majority 
of parents reported using corporal punishment, the researchers found that two 
important key points emerged when parents were asked about the last time 
they used it: “First, a smack on the bottom or on the hand, arm or leg is by far 
the most common form of physical chastisement, accounting for 96% of all 
incidents. Secondly, in almost 9 out of 10 cases, the child was smacked or hit 
[just] once.”123 
Furthermore, even if a few parents are more likely to engage in disciplinary 
behavior that escalates from corporal punishment to abuse, it does not justify 
banning an otherwise acceptable practice. Dieting has been argued to lead to 
eating disorders. Drinking beer socially has been argued to cause alcoholism or 
drunk driving. And the availability of condoms has been argued to produce 
higher rates of teen sexual activity. Even if these connections were found to be 
causal—should that change the legality of dieting, drinking, or using condoms? 
Our society values autonomy, and it simply cannot be said that harmless—and 
when used correctly, beneficial—activities should be outlawed so that a few 
citizens can be protected from their own lack of self-control. 
Ultimately, “saving parents from themselves” through spanking bans is 
neither necessary nor acceptable. The law should not impose prohibitions on all 
parents’ disciplinary actions in order to target the more-specific harmful actions 
of a few, especially actions that are already outlawed and need only be better 
defined and enforced. Instead, the law should remain open to parents’ 
beneficial use of corporal punishment, and parents should be educated to assure 
that when they choose corporal punishment, they do so only when it is safe and 
effective for their children. 
Just as addictive personalities should not drink alcohol or use drugs, some parents—
those with a low tolerance for frustration, a history of violence, an inordinate need to 
control others, and those who are impulsive, narcissistic, and immature—should not 
spank. The fact that some parents punish excessively and unwisely is not an argument, 
however, for counseling all parents not to punish at all.124 
B. Limits of Punishment of Adolescents 
Bans on punishment of adolescents have not been as widely discussed as 
those proposed for young children. However, the Canadian Supreme Court 
decision in Canadian Foundation,125 which banned physical discipline of 
teenagers, triggers a discussion that will likely be broadened in the future. 
Presumably, state statutes and standards that now make age a factor do so 
for this higher age range as well as for young children. But the prospect of 
broader action, like a ban, is complex, for corporal punishment of adolescents 
raises considerations and concerns distinct from those of the three-and-under 
 
 122. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 55. 
 123. Id. at 28. 
 124. Baumrind et al., supra note 78. 
    125.   Canadian Found. for Children, Youth, & the Law v. Canada, 1 S.C.R. 76 (Can.) 
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provisions. On the one hand, such action raises questions of efficacy different 
from those concerning toddlers. Adolescents are clearly capable of making the 
connection between their actions and a corresponding physical punishment, 
which obviates the analogous key criticism against the efficacy with young 
children. The question remains, though, whether older children will learn from 
such punishment or simply resent their parents’ use of the method at a time 
when they are developing their own autonomy. 
Corporal punishment of adolescents also raises questions of propriety. 
Unlike very young children, for whom experts disagree about resulting 
psychological harms, there seems to be consensus that psychological harms are 
greater for children once they reach a certain age. Some studies have found that 
outcomes for spanking of teenagers are “predominantly detrimental”126 or that 
such punishment is “likely to be futile and counterproductive.”127 What experts 
do not agree on, however, is the age at which the punishment becomes 
inappropriate.128 
Corporal punishment of adolescents is still widespread—almost half of all 
children in early adolescence experience it.129 But it does not raise the same 
concerns about the vulnerability of the younger child—that a parent will take 
the act too far, and the child will be too young to resist and too fragile to 
withstand the force. Quite the contrary: adolescents are often just as strong, or 
stronger, than their parents. They are also often more capable of leaving, and 
even more likely to fight back. 
Of course, many parents still find corporal punishment to be effective for 
their adolescent children, though studies suggest that parents use it less 
frequently with children as they get older. For example, Larzelere found that 
for older children, physical punishment had more-beneficial outcomes than any 
other disciplinary method except for grounding.130 And even more than in young 
toddlers, the psychological development and needs of adolescents can range 
widely among individual children. The problems posed by line-drawing in 
young children are exacerbated in adolescents, for the stage of mental 
development of a child, and corresponding discipline needs, cannot accurately 
be assumed from a child’s age. 
Though the adolescent years present a comparatively better candidate for 
an age-based corporal-punishment ban, this period of child growth is even less 
 
 126. Larzelere, supra note 89, at 827. 
 127. Baumrind, supra note 92, at 829. 
 128. See, e.g., Baumrind, supra note 76, at 179 (arguing corporal punishment should not be used 
after puberty); James Dobson, Preteen Discipline: How Discipline Changes as Your Child Moves into 
the Preteen Years, FOCUS ON THE FAMILY, available at http://www.focusonthefamily.com/ 
parenting/schoolage_children/disciplining_schoolage_kids/preteen_discipline.aspx (reprinted from 
JAMES DOBSON, THE NEW STRONG-WILLED CHILD (1978)) (stating that corporal punishment loses its 
effectiveness and should be discontinued for most children around age ten). 
 129. Heather A. Turner & David Finkelhor, Corporal Punishment as a Stressor Among Youth, 58 J. 
MARRIAGE & FAM. 155, 155 (1996). 
 130. Larzelere, supra note 89, at 827. 
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studied than that of early childhood. If experts and legislators seek to learn 
more about the effects of corporal punishment and ensure that it is used when it 
will be effective and not harmful, the later adolescent period should be studied 
more fully, and legislative efforts should be targeted in this arena more 
intensely. Currently, the dangers of severe physical harm are less for 
adolescents than they are for toddlers, and the individual needs of adolescents 
vary greatly. Therefore, using age as a factor is far more appropriate than a 
stark line in the sand, at least as the state of knowledge currently stands. Efforts 
to better understand the effects of corporal punishment on this age group, as 
well as the state of current usage of the method, would be efforts well spent. 
VI 
WHAT IS JUSTIFIED? 
Opponents of corporal punishment are critical of the extensive use of such 
punishment and of the severity with which it is sometimes inflicted. Yet experts, 
legislators, and parents all agree that punishment in those instances is wrong: it 
should be disallowed when it is too frequent or too harsh, for then, the question 
is one of child abuse, not child discipline. 
But opponents of corporal punishment go too far in saying that physical 
punishment should never be inflicted. Instead, courts have held to a 
“reasonableness” standard for so long, and legislatures have hesitated to get 
involved in the process of line-drawing on parents’ behavior, for a reason. The 
Arizona Court of Appeals may have said it best: 
One cannot expound an inflexible rule which would define what, under all conditions, 
would be reasonable or excessive force in the disciplining of a child. As children vary 
in degrees of sensitivity, responsibility and other qualities of character, as well as 
tolerance to pain, age, sex and physical condition, so must the degree of parental 
severity vary, especially when balanced against the gravity of the particular offense for 
which punishment is to be meted out.131 
There are appropriate ways for parents to spank their children. It is true that 
some shocking cases have been decided because of the sometimes rampant 
flexibility found in what is “reasonable.” It is therefore good that legislatures 
and courts are beginning to provide more guidance on this fuzzy standard. 
States are beginning to implement this guidance through examples and factors 
to be taken into account. This is certainly progress. 
The same is true when the age of a child is considered. The introduction of 
age as an explicit consideration is a necessary and useful development in the 
law, which also benefits and protects both children and parents. Appropriate 
punishment will vary as a child grows older; certain actions that are not 
acceptable for a two-year-old are appropriate when the same child is nine. It is 
equally true that a physical punishment effective at age eight may no longer be 
so at age fifteen. But it is also true that a particular two-year-old will react very 
differently than another two-year-old to a certain punishment and that a child’s 
 
 131. Arizona v. Hunt, 406 P.2d 208, 222 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965). 
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size, maturity, understanding, and culpability will not always perfectly 
correspond to birthday milestones. 
 It appears that spanking is most useful from the age of eighteen months 
until a child reaches puberty.132 But the inquiry cannot end there. Prohibiting all 
physical punishment of a two-year-old (simply because he is two) is no more 
acceptable than endorsing all physical punishment of an eight-year-old (simply 
because he is eight). Instead, any assessment of discipline should be on a case-
by-case basis, taking into account many factors. Every child’s circumstances are 
unique, and we cannot expect children to be properly trained if parents are not 
free to account for these circumstances. The decision about spanking should 
always consider age, but it should not be determined by it. 
 
 132. Baumrind, supra note 92, at 829. 
